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In a recent issue of this journal I proposed a rereading of Foucault as a Kantian critical philosopher. In the pages of the present issue of the journal, Colin McQuillan offers a challenge to my reading by taking express issue with my claim that Foucault can be productively read as a Kantian. To summarize the context for both McQuillan’s reply and the present response, it will be useful to point out that the primary aim of my article was to dispute the recent trend in Foucault scholarship according to which archaeology and genealogy are best seen as efforts in phenomenological philosophy, stemming from various phenomenologists ranging from Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Jean Cavailles.1 The occasion for my discussion was provided by an important recent article by Kevin Thomspon in which he proposes reading Foucault through a minority tradition of phenomenology, referred to by Thompson as a ‚phenomenology of the concept‛ or ‚realistic phenomenology‛ and located primarily in Cavailles, Bachelard, and Canguilhem.2 My article was published with an insightful reply by Thompson, in which he challenged my discussion of certain limitations that I located in the Foucault-as-phenomenologist literature.3 In my further response to Thompson’s reply, I took up his textual and philosophical challenge to my article, but only briefly discussed the background historiographical and metaphilosophical difficulties lingering behind our discussions.4

Appropriation and Permission in the History of Philosophy: Response to McQuillan