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This article draws on the Supreme Court of British Columbia’s Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada [the Polygamy Reference] as a concrete example of the benefits and limitations of intense judicial reliance on social science evidence in the adjudication of constitutional rights and freedoms at the trial level. By examining the evidence tendered, I suggest that the current adversarial model of adjudication is illsuited to combining the legal and the social scientific endeavours. The divergent values, methodologies and objectives of the legal and scientific enterprises severely limit the benefits that the former can yield, thus compromising the effectiveness and utility of the courts for social groups whose claims are heavily grounded in non-legal evidence. Further, I argue that the vast amounts of contradictory evidence typically tendered in rights challenges, as well as the complex and controversial nature of Charter questions and the inevitable need for judges to adjudicate values, risk resulting in undue deference to the legislator, hinder the delivery of justice and ultimately undermine the raison-d’etre of Charter litigation. Cet article concerne le renvoi porte devant la Cour supreme de la Colombie-Britannique au sujet de l’article 293 du Code criminel [Polygamy Reference – renvoi sur la polygamie], qui constitue un exemple concret des avantages et inconvenients de l’utilisation intensive des elements de preuve relevant des sciences sociales dans la determination des droits et libertes constitutionnels en premiere instance. En examinant les elements de preuve presentes, j’affirme dans cet article que le modele actuel de reglement des litiges, qui repose sur l’approche accusatoire, se prete mal a la combinaison des demarches juridiques et de celles qui relevent des sciences sociales. Les valeurs, methodologies et objectifs divergents des demarches juridiques et scientifiques restreignent les avantages inherents aux methodes juridiques, ce qui compromet l’efficacite et l’utilite des tribunaux pour les groupes sociaux dont les revendications reposent en grande partie sur des elements de preuve de nature non juridique. Je soutiens egalement que la multitude d’elements de preuve contradictoires habituellement presentes dans les litiges mettant en cause des droits, conjuguee a la nature complexe et controversee des questions concernant la Charte et a la necessite inevitable pour les juges de soupeser des valeurs, risque de se traduire par une trop grande deference envers le legislateur, de nuire a l’administration de la justice et, en bout de ligne, de saper la raison d’etre des litiges fondes sur la Charte.

WHEN DISCIPLINES COLLIDE: POLYGAMY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES ON TRIAL