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In two-player contests, optimal delegation involves giving the agent incentives to maximize the principal's payoff while in contests with more than two players incentives will be different from the principal's payoff maximization. These results are related to the evolutionary stability of payoff-maximizing preferences in the model of indirect evolution in general symmetric games, which depends on the slope of the reaction function being zero at equilibrium. Further examples of the relationship are also discussed.

On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior