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Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proves this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.

The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements