Open AccessSustaining Input on Credit through Dynamic Incentives and Information Sharing: Lessons from a framed field experiment
Author(s) -
Serge Adjog,
Lenis Saweda O. LiverpoolTasie,
Robert Shupp
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
faculty of 1000 research ltd
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Reports
DOI - 10.21955/gatesopenres.1116053.1
Subject(s) - incentive , business , field (mathematics) , actuarial science , economics , finance , control (management) , government (linguistics) , payment , public economics , information system , context (archaeology) , debt , risk analysis (engineering) , information asymmetry , work (physics)
A Dynamic incentive model is used to develop conditions that minimize strategic default in agricultural inputs on credit to rural smallholder farmers. Hypotheses from the model are tested using data collected through a framed field experiment that simulates a market for input on credit
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