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The argument has been made that in her later works Arendt finally subsumes judging as a thinking activity under the vita contemplativa rather than as part of action in the vita activa. This article argues against this interpretation of Arendt’s unfinished theory of judgment defended specifically by Ronald Beiner and Richard Bernstein. Judgment as representative and imaginative thinking remains part of the vita activa because, as distinct from philosophical thinking that is solitary, judgment is communal. Judgment always depends upon the presence of others in a particular public sphere, and in the act of judging an individual is actually engaged in creating a community of those judging. The judgment capacities of the actor and the spectator have a complementary function in preserving plurality in the public realm, and, as such, they are part of the vita activa.

Judgment Capacities of the Actor and the Spectator in Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Judgment