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This report presents the results of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission`s Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) review of operating experience of main turbine-generator overspeed and overspeed protection systems. It includes an indepth examination of the turbine overspeed event which occurred on November 9, 1991, at the Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant. It also provides information concerning actions taken by other utilities and the turbine manufacturers as a result of the Salem overspeed event. AEOD`s study reviewed operating procedures and plant practices. It noted differences between turbine manufacturer designs and recommendations for operations, maintenance, and testing, and also identified significant variations in the manner that individual plants maintain and test their turbine overspeed protection systems. AEOD`s study provides insight into the shortcomings in the design, operation, maintenance, testing, and human factors associated with turbine overspeed protection systems. Operating experience indicates that the frequency of turbine overspeed events is higher than previously thought and that the bases for demonstrating compliance with NRC`s General Design Criterion (GDC) 4, Environmental and dynamic effects design bases, may be nonconservative with respect to the assumed frequency

Operating experience feedback report -- turbine-generator overspeed protection systems: Commercial power reactors. Volume 11