English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

In this paper we apply social network analysis to study the boards of directors of 107 large listed Russian firms between 2009 and 2014. Traditional corporate governance metrics, such as demographic characteristics, experience or multiple directorships, confirm a previously established positive trend towards greater independence and better qualification of the boards of Russian firms. We also find a decrease in the centrality of directors, which corroborates the diminishing concentration of power of some directors. The most connected firms have a specific profile since they are larger, have lower market valuations, and stronger ties with government (both due to higher proportions of government owned shares and a greater number of directors who are former politicians). Our findings also demonstrate that the boards of financialinstitutions are less connected, whereas political and independent directors are more centralized.

Networks of directors on Russian boards: The hidden part of the corporate governance iceberg