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This paper examines the institutional determinants of discipline in legislative par- ties: what tools enable a party leader to induce her party to support an unpopular position? The model formalizes the tradeo between resources at the leader's discre- tion, and the incumbent's need to maintain a minimum level of support to continue leading. I show that contrary to conventional wisdom, promises of future partisan benefits (such as nominations to party lists) are insucient to grant significant power to the party leader. Unless a majority of the party agrees (ex ante) with the in- cumbent's preferred position, future resources are valuable to the incumbent only if she also distributes benefits on the spot, or if she is protected by a supermajority requirement for removal. Moreover, I show that there is a complementarity between benefits distributed on the spot and the value of promises of future benefits, and that the multiplier eect of current resources is higher the more vulnerable the leader is to internal threats. As a result, more vulnerable leaders will allocate more current resources to buy members of their own party instead of the opposition.

Contestable Leaderships: Party Discipline and Vote Buying in Legislatures