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This paper analyzes how learning a borrower’s creditworthiness, from past lending deci- sion by a rival bank that is publicly observable through private or public credit reporting systems, aects the performance of subsequent lending competitions. Our analysis of twice- repeated lending competitions demonstrates that such ex post information sharing causes inecient,and excessive screening of new borrowers when banks undertake transaction bank- ing since each bank expects future disadvantages to result from the information revelation. Relationship banking arises endogenously as a defense against such anticipated disadvantage, and improves the economic eciency,by alleviating the excessive screening. JEL Classifications: G21 L14

Endogenous Relationship Banking to Alleviate Excessive Screening in Transaction Banking