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Based on the observation that industries are often geographically concentrated, this paper proposes a new political economy model of trade protection. We associate the sectors of a specific factors model with electoral distri cts populated by continua of heterogeneous voters who differ in their relative factor endowments. We show how strategic delegation leads each district to elect a repr esentative who is more protectionist than the median voter. The legislature formed by these representatives then sets tariffs that are strictly positive. Introducing a dditional policy instruments reveals a trade-off between efficiency and regional targeta bility.

Why Legislators are Protectionists: The Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs