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We analyze a dynamic model of international environmental agreements (IEAs) where countries cannot make long-term commitments or use sanctions or rewards to induce cooperation. Countries can communicate with each other to build endogenous beliefs about the random consequences of (re)opening negotiation. If countries are patient, an effective agreement can be reached after a succession of short-lived ineffective agreements. This eventual success requires \sober optimism": the understanding that cooperation is possible but not easy to achieve. Negotiations matter because beliefs are important. An empirical application illustrates the importance of sober optimism in the climate agreement.

Sober Optimism and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements