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An antitrust authority deters collusion using nes and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are pro ts, but so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-o higher pro ts against higher expected nes. If rms are suciently patient, leniency is ine ective; it may even increase collusion. Increasing the probability of an investigation at low levels does not increase deterrence. Increasing the probability of an investigation at high levels reduces collusion, yet never completely.

The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion