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Managerial communications often contain biased information because of managerial incentives and other influences. A common assumption in accounting literature is that if investors are aware of managerial biases, they will be able to fully adjust for those known biases when reacting to managerial communications. Drawing on insights from psychology, I experimentally document that investors are not able to fully adjust for known biases in managerial communications—even when investors know the quantitative amount of the manager’s bias. Indeed, investors behave contrary to economic theory as they are unable to fully unravel the effects of known biases when rendering judgments about the firm. My study has implications for researchers, regulators, and investors. I greatly appreciate Lisa Koonce, my dissertation chair, for her guidance and direction on this project. I also thank Patrick Badolato, Brett Cantrell, Shuping Chen, Marlone Henderson, Eric Hirst, Volker Laux, Tracie Majors, John McInnis, Todd Thornock, Jeff Wilks, Michael Williamson, David Wood, and brownbag participants at the University of Texas at Austin for their insightful comments and suggestions. Funding for this paper was provided by the Harrington Fellowship and the Deloitte Foundation.

Can Investors Fully Adjust for Known Biases in Manager Communications?