English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

Strategies of international risk management, as the implementation of tradable emission permits, feed back to the incentive structure of a treaty like the Kyoto Protocol. Discussing the Kyoto Protocol the question was: Should there be any restrictions on the trading of emission permits or not? With the help of a simple two country model it is shown that the enforcement of environmental treaties critically depends on the type and the intensity of national risk preferences. Assuming that the ‘global alliance of risk’ decreases with each co-operative contribution risk aversion is a prerequisite for enhancing the chances of global risk management. It is moreover the national intensity of risk aversion that determines whether trade should be restricted or not. In order to improve international coalition formation less risk averse countries might be able to “dictate” the rules of the game, here: the design of the permit regime.

Inducing Environmental Co-operation by the Design of Emission Permits