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Speculative Attacks are a coordination,game,with multiple equilibria: If a sufficient number of traders expect devaluation, market pressure forces the central bank to abandon a currency peg that it would have kept otherwise. Thus, expectations are self-fulfilling. Applying the global games approach, Morris and Shin (1998) have shown that there is a unique equilibrium in threshold strategies, if traders have private information,on the,state of the economy.,Uniqueness,requires,private information to be sufficiently precise when,com pared to public information. This has triggered a discussion,on the,optimal,policy to release information to financial markets,in order to prevent crises with self-fulfilling features.  Our experimental,design imitates the speculative attacks model,by Morris and Shin.

Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information