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Canadian Criminal law distinguishes between the thresholds of “reasonable suspicion” and “reasonable grounds to believe” required in order for police officers to lawfully arrest persons, conduct certain forms of searches, and to obtain warrants. Officers wishing to lawfully exercise these powers must satisfy the requisite legal standard, or risk violating individuals’ constitutional rights with the ensuing possibility of exclusion of evidence. Unfortunately, recent attempts to clarify differences between the two thresholds is complex to articulate, confusing, and impracticable.This article examines the fundamental difficulties related to the current theoretical and practical distinctions between both standards. These issues are important for legal practitioners and judges interpreting whether the standards have been reached and whether constitutional rights have been violated, and, as a theoretical and pragmatic basis upon which to interpret the scope of new police powers.It is argued that the current confusion between both standards arises from the faulty usage of notions of “possibility” and “probability.” Furthermore, in identifying new police powers, courts have sometimes imposed legal standards which cannot safely or reasonably be met. Ultimately, I will attempt to provide a more coherent theoretical basis for distinguishing between both standards based on comprehensible pragmatic considerations. As a result, I hope to not only articulate a more simple and meaningful distinction between both standards based on certain overarching considerations, but which will also assist in identifying which standard ought to apply in identifying new police powers.

The Suspicious Distinction between Reasonable Suspicion and Reasonable Grounds to Believe