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We model the relationship between market power and both loan interest rates andbank risk without placing strong restrictions on the moral hazard problems betweenborrowers and banks, and between banks and a government guarantor. Our resultssuggest that these relationships hinge on intuitive parameterizations of the overlappingmoral hazard problems. Surprisingly, for lending markets with a high degreeof borrower moral hazard, but limited bank moral hazard, we find that banks withmarket...

Monitoring, Moral Hazard, and Market Power: A Model of Bank Lending