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There is considerable heterogeneity in the organizational structures of CMBS loan originators that may influence originators’ underwriting incentives. We examine data on over 30,000 commercial mortgages securitized into CMBS since 1999, and find significant differences in the propensity to become delinquent depending upon whether a loan was originated by a commercial bank, investment bank, insurance company, finance company, conduit lender, or foreign-owned entity. These differences hold both before and after controlling for key loan characteristics. We then explore possible explanations for these results. Reliance on external financing during a loan’s warehousing period—the period between origination and securitization—could explain the relatively poor performance of loans originated by conduit lenders. Also, despite the potential for engaging in adverse selection, balance-sheet lenders—commercial banks, insurance companies and finance companies—actually underwrote higher-quality loans.

Differences Across Originators in CMBS Loan Underwriting