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We present a general model of the interaction between settlement and the emergence of de facto property rights on frontiers prior to governments establishing and enforcing de jure property rights. Settlers have an incentive to establish de facto property rights to avoid the dissipation associated with open access conditions. The potential rent associated with more exclusivity drives the "demand' for commons arrangements. As the potential rental stream from land increases due to enhanced scarcity there is a greater demand for more exclusivity beyond what can be sustained with commons arrangements. In some instances claimants will petition the government for de jure property rights to their claims - formal titles. In other instances it may be cheaper to acquire titles through fraudulent means. To the extent that governments supply property rights to those with first possession, land conflict will generally be minimal, though there may be political protests. But, governments face differing political constituencies and may not allocate de jure rights to the current claimants. Moreover, governments may assign de jure rights but not be willing to enforce the rights. This may generate potential or actual conflict over land depending on the violence potentials held by the de facto and de jure land claimants. We examine land settlement and land conflict on the frontiers of Australia, the U.S. and Brazil. We are particularly interested in examining the emergence, sustainability, and collapse of commons arrangements in specific historical contexts. Our analysis indicates that the emergence of demand driven de facto property rights arrangements was relatively peaceful in Australia and the U.S. where claimants had reasons to organize collectively. The settlement process in Brazil was more prone to conflict because agriculture required fewer collective activities and as a result claimants resorted to periodic violent self-enforcement. In all three cases the movement from de facto to de jure property rights led to potential or actual conflict because of insufficient government enforcement. * For comments we thank Eric Alston, Lee Cronk, P.J. Hill, Gary Libecap, Henry Smith and participants at: a seminar on social norms at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton; a conference on "Australian Economic History in the Long Run;" and Monash University. Alston and Mueller acknowledge the support of NSF grant #528146. Alston thanks the STEP Program at Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton for their support as a Visiting Research Scholar during 2008/2009 and The Australian National University for support as in Research Fellow in 2009. We thank Eric Alston for research assistance.

De Facto and De Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement and Land Conflict on the Australian, Brazilian and U.S. Frontiers