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5 1iews of payment systems competition have evolved during the past generaSI’ tion. When automated teller machine (ATM) netw-orks were first created in the 1970s, policymakers considered two models for these emerging networks: (1) a monopoly/public utility network model, with open access obligations and (potentially) some form of regulation or (2) a competing network model, with numerous networks competing in a lightly regulated environment. This article describes howthese visions of network competition have evolved. Even though the network competition model was chosen in the 1970s, because of a history of nonenforcement by antitrust agencies and regulators, it appears that by the close of this century the monopoly/public utility model may he victorious. This article describes how that change occurred and considers whether it is appropriate. The first section of the article describes general trends in antitrust enforcement affecting payment systexns networks since the I 970s. The next section examines the framework applied to antitrust analysis of ATM network mergers and is followed by a section applying this analysis to two recent ATM network mergers. The article examines how the monopoly/public utility model appears to have prevailed in the ATM network merger context.

Payment Systems and Antitrust: Can the Opportunities for Network Competition be Recognized?