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L’objet de cet article est d’etudier, sous forme d’un jeu, la concurrence entre une banque et un operateur de telephonie mobile sur un marche ou les services sont differencies horizontalement. L’hypothese retenue dans cette etude est que les firmes se font une concurrence en localisation geographique, et le choix de localisation sera interprete comme un choix dans un espace de produits. Pour ce faire, le modele de Hotelling a ete mobilise pour apprehender d’une part, l’impact de la concurrence sur l’industrie bancaire en Afrique, et d’autre part, les avantages strategiques dont beneficient les deux acteurs. Il ressort de cette etude qu’il n’existe pas d’equilibre de Nash en strategie pure en jeu simultane, mais qu’une structure de « leader-follower » conduit a l’equilibre et permet aux firmes de realiser des profits positifs. Banques et operateurs de telephonie mobile ont donc un avantage mutuel a cooperer, sous des formes diverses qui restent a definir, plutot qu’a se faire concurrence. This paper focuses on studying, in the form of a game, the competition between a bank and a mobile operator in a market where services are differentiated horizontally. The hypothesis used in this study shows that firms compete with one another within a geographic location. The choice of location will be interpreted using a product space. To achieve this, the Hotelling model was mobilized to understand, on the one hand, the impact of competition on the banking industry in Africa, and on the other hand, the strategic advantages enjoyed by both actors. This study shows that there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategy in regard to simultaneous play, but that a leader-follower structure leads to equilibrium and allows firms to make positive profits. Banks and mobile phone operators therefore have a mutual advantage to cooperate, in various forms that are yet to be defined, rather than competing with each other.

Concurrence Entre Banques Commerciales Et Opérateurs De Téléphonie Mobile En Afrique Subsaharienne