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L’internationalisation du droit constitutionnel est une evidence que les Etats d’Afrique francophone ne sauraient ignorer. La distribution des « competences constitutionnelles internationales » entre les pouvoirs, qui constitue une des manifestations de l’internationalisation, n’est pas sans incidence sur leur equilibre. Les analyses doctrinales de cette repartition des prerogatives entre les organes des pouvoirs executif et legislatif ont, dans leur majorite, forge l’idee d’une preeminence du President de la Republique dans la conclusion des traites et accords internationaux. Ce desequilibre affirme par la doctrine, a l’examen des Constitutions africaines, remet au gout du jour le respect des exigences elementaires de la separation des pouvoirs ; et merite, de ce fait, l’attention de la presente reflexion. Celle-ci a pour objet de relativiser cette solution de principe, mecaniquement transposee aux regimes constitutionnels de conclusion des engagements internationaux des Etats d’Afrique subsaharienne, et revet ainsi un double interet : theorique et pratique. Pour y parvenir, l’etude comparee des differents systemes constitutionnels des Etats africains d’expression francaise a la lumiere du positivisme normativiste, et a certains egards sociologique, a permis de constater un certain desequilibre dans l’attribution et la delimitation de la competence de negociation des conventions internationales. Cependant, l’articulation des competences de ratification/approbation constitue le point, par excellence, d’equilibre entre les pouvoirs executif et legislatif dans la procedure de conclusion des traites. Dans cet esprit, le chef de l’Etat ne saurait plus etre regarde comme le seul maitre a bord dans l’expression du consentement definitif a etre lie ; le Parlement ne se trouve pas en retrait. The internationalization of constitutional law is obvious that Frenchspeaking African states cannot ignore. The distribution of “international constitutional jurisdiction” among the powers, which is one of the manifestations of internationalization, is not without impact on the balance relating thereto. The doctrinal analyses of this distribution of prerogatives between the organs of the executive and the legislative powers have, for the most part, forged the idea of a pre-eminence of the President of the Republic in the conclusion of international treaties and agreements. This imbalance affirmed by the doctrine, on the examination of the African Constitutions, brings up to date the respect of elementary requirements of the separation of the powers, thus the rationale of the present thought. It is about relativizing this purely provisional solution, transposed mechanically to the constitutional regimes of conclusion of the international commitments of Sub-Saharan Africa States, and thus has a double interest: theoretical and practical. To achieve this, the comparative study of the different constitutional systems of French-speaking African States with the means of normativist and, in some respects, sociological positivism, has allowed us to note a certain imbalance in the attribution and delimitation of the scope of jurisdiction in the negotiation of international conventions. However, the articulation of the powers of ratification/approval constitutes the point, par excellence, of balance between the executive and legislative powers in the procedure of conclusion of treaties. The head of State cannot be regarded as the only master on board in the expression of the final consent to be bound; the Parliament does not remain in the background.

european scientific journal

L’équilibre des Pouvoirs et la Répartition des Compétences en Matière de Conclusion des Traités dans les Etats d’Afrique Francophone. Du rendezvous Manqué à la Rencontre Fertile