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Spanish Abstract: Dentro de los diversos intentos por justificar las normas del discurso practico son de consideracion la teoria universal pragmatica de HABERMAS (HABERMAS 1995 (1976); 1983) y la fundamentacion ultima pragmatico trascendental de APEL (APEL 1973; 1998 (1976)). ALEXY responde con su fundamentacion de las normas constitutivas del discurso a una necesidad sistemica de su teoria de la argumentacion practica (ALEXY 1991; 1993; 1995), que el define como una teoria kantiana (ALEXY 1995). Es por ello que la fundamentacion de ALEXY adquiere caracteristicas propias diversas a los intentos de fundamentacion precedentes. Dos niveles de fundamentacion componen el argumento alexiano dirigido a sustentar las normas constitutivas del discurso. Un primer nivel dirigido a la fundamentacion de la validez universal de dichas normas en el plano pragmatico o de la comunicacion, y un segundo nivel complementario dirigido a la fundamentacion de su validez universal en el plano de la accion. Dado que el argumento que sirve de punto de partida al argumento trascendental que ALEXY usa para la fundamentacion de las normas constitutivas del discurso en el nivel pragmatico se fundamenta en razones empiricas, dicho argumento no es aceptado por el esceptico en razon a su caracter verdadero sino en razon a su caracter plausible. Una fundamentacion tal parece demasiado debil como para sustentar la pretension ontologica asociada a la revelacion de las normas constitutivas de nuestras practicas discursivas. Con el objeto de complementar la fundamentacion de la validez universal de los principios de la razon desde el nivel practico, ALEXY ha introducido la distincion en el campo del habla entre la validez subjetiva y la validez objetiva de las normas (ALEXY 1995). Respecto a la primera, ALEXY ha afirmado la validez categorica de los principios de la razon. Respecto de la segunda, al justificar la validez universal de los principios de la razon en el campo practico a partir de la generacion de motivaciones e intereses de los sujetos en relacion con su conducta externa, ALEXY ha aceptado de manera implicita la validez hipotetica de estas normas. Dado que los principios de la razon son condicion suficiente para el logro del fin de la practica argumentativa ideal (ALEXY 1995), el caracter categorico o hipotetico que se predique de ellos se predicara tambien del principio de universalizacion. En este sentido, de acuerdo a la fundamentacion alexiana, el principio de universalizacion tiene un doble caracter. Desde el punto de vista practico subjetivo el principio de universalizacion tiene validez categorica. Desde el punto de vista practico objetivo el principio de universalizacion tiene validez hipotetica. No obstante, si se predica el caracter hipotetico del principio de universalizacion este ya no sera una regla moral en sentido kantiano y de esta forma la teoria del discurso practico racional habra perdido su caracter distintivo.English Abstract: Among the various attempts to justify the norms of practical discourse, the universal pragmatic theory of HABERMAS (HABERMAS 1995 (1976); 1983) and the transcendental-pragmatic ultimate justification of APEL (APEL 1973; 1998 (1976)) should especially be considered. By means of his strategy of justification of discourse norms, (ALEXY 1991; 1993; 1995) Alexy has responded to a systemic requirement of his own theory of argumentation which has been defined by him as a Kantian theory. (ALEXY 1995) That is why ALEXYʼS proposal takes on characteristics of its own, which distinguish it from previous attempts of justification. The Alexyan justification of the constitutive norms of discourse is composed of two levels: The first level directed towards the justification of their universal validity from the pragmatic point of view, and the second complementary level directed towards the justification of their universal validity from the practical perspective. Given that the starting point of the transcendental argument that ALEXY uses for the justification of the constitutive norms of discourse at the pragmatic level is based on empirical reasons, the skeptic does not accept this argument because it is true, but because it is plausible. This justification seems too weak to sustain the ontological claim required for making explicit the constitutive norms of our discursive practices. In order to demonstrate the universal practical validity of rationality principles, Alexy has introduced the distinction in the field of speech between subjective validity and objective validity. (ALEXY 1995) Regarding the first one, ALEXY has held the categorical validity of rationality principles. Regarding the second one, Alexyʼs account has to assume that rationality principles are hypothetical in nature, due to the fact that ALEXYʼS account attempts to demonstrate the universal validity of these norms based on their motivational power. Due to the fact that the rationality principles are sufficient conditions for reaching the aim of the ideal discursive practice which is defined by the principle of universalization, the categorical or hypothetical feature that is attributed to these norms will also be attributed to the principle of universalization. In this vein, according to ALEXYʼS account the principle of universalization has a double nature. Indeed, from the subjective practical point of view, this principle has categorical validity. From the objective practical point of view this principle has hypothetical validity. However, if the hypothetical nature of the principle of universalization is assumed, then this principle will no longer be a moral norm in the Kantian sense. In this way, the rational discourse theory will lose its distinctiveness.

Una cuestión de interés. Sobre la justificación del discurso práctico de Robert Alexy