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s from existence, to features of reality. The fact that we consider what something is without judging that it is te lls us little correspondingly about its ontological status. Dewan (I 984), in my view, does not manage to meet this objection. He grants (p. 149) that the real distinction is in the first stage only "confusedly or imperfectly known." He admits that it is charac­ teristic of our abstractive knowledge that essences are grasped without grasping actual existence. But to admit this is to read the "Intellect11s essen­ tiae Argument" epistemologically, and to fail to read it, as Dewan himself proposes to do, "as quidditatively as possible." II . PROPOSAL: TWO NEW PREMISES FOR THE PROOFS OF THE "ESSENCE-ESSE' REAL DISTI CTION In what follows , I propose a still more quidditative reading of De ente 4 than Dewan s. I draw attention, in effect, to two premises that Aquinas pre­ supposes in the "Intellect us essentiae Argument. " In fact , if these premises are true, nearlyall nine of Aquinas' proofs for the real distinction, as cata­ logued by me in 2007 (based on the work of Cornelio Fabro, Leo Sweeney, and John Wippel) succeed , avoiding the Question-Begging Objection. In other words, they succeed if we read them as quidditatively as possi ble, not allowing one 's "existentialist Thomism" to prescind from an authentic es­ sentialism. The reader will recognize my contribution as a sympathetic de­ velopment of Dewan's thought. A . PREMISE A: I CREATURES THERE Is A REAL D ISTINCTIO_ BET\VEE E SSENCE A D SUPPOSIT . One will read each of Aquinas ' proofs of the famous real distinction quidditatively when one sees that they presuppose a prior not-so -famous real distinction: that between essence taken with precision and the whole indi­ vidual substance or supposit. Let me begin by making a historical point. I must admit that one cannot prove textually that the De ente presupposes this distinction. It is implicit in De ente 2 and 3, and De ente 4's reasoning does not succeed without it. But we should recall that Aquinas knows this distinction very well from the works of Albert, including from the D ivine

How Save Aquinas’s “Intellectus essentiae Argument” for the Real Distinction between Essence and Esse?