"Party Formation in Parliamentary Democracies"

The political power of elected representatives isdetermined by politicians' membership negotiations with parties. Inparliamentary systems, party control over government functionsgenerates club goods, which increases the value of partymembership. Moreover, in party-centered parliamentary systems,getting influential positions requires party leader's approval,which gives the leader monopsonistic recruiting power. As a result,politicians may relegate their political power to leaders whenmembership is more rewarding than acting independently. I developan equilibrium model of party formation in a parliamentarydemocracy that incorporates parties' provision of club goods, rentsharing between politicians and party leaders, as well aspoliticians' outside options. Politicians' rankings of partiescritically depend on the size of the party as well as on their ownpolitical assets. Through their control of government functions,bigger parties can provide greater club goods but tax politicians'rents more upon entry. Because of this, politicians with moreassets tend to prefer smaller parties. I structurally estimate mymodel for Turkey with a unique dataset of 33 parties, 2,000politicians who gained seats in parliament, and 35,000 politicianswho were on party ballot lists between 1995 and 2014. My modelmatches the high level of party switching (28.5%) that ischaracteristic of many party-centered systems. I find that Turkishparties accumulate club goods more easily than they produce rents,which leads to ever stronger party control. I also find thatpoliticians with good labor market options are not productive inthe political arena. In a counterfactual analysis, I find thatmembers of smaller (bigger) parties are more powerful inparty-centered (candidate-centered) systems.