English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Although every theory of the nature of law acknowledges that the content of the law is determined by contingent social facts regarding the practices of persons who function as officials in a legal system, legal positivism is distinguished from other theories in that it holds that, ultimately, these social practices are, at bottom, the sole determinants of legal content. The content of the law, on this view, is determined by the legislative and adjudicative activities of officials who have adopted and follow (or “practice”) a rule of recognition to govern these activities. The rule of recognition is the basic legal norm that determines whether any other norm has the status of law (and thereby defines the criteria of legality, which is not, strictly speaking, a norm) and itself has the status of law in virtue of the contingent social fact that it is something like a convention practiced by the officials in a system where citizens generally conform their behavior to the norms that count as law under this rule. Positivists, of course, are divided on the issue of whether morality can play a role in determining legal content. Inclusive positivists, like Jules Coleman, argue that moral norms can play a role in determining the content of the law; if officials practice a conventional rule of recognition that

How much a theory of law can tell us about the nature of morality: a response to Mark Greenberg’s How facts make law