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The paper is devoted to the corporate governance intelligence system investigation as the part of the complex stakeholder-related approach to the corporate strategic intelligence system (CSIS). The special attention is given to the minority shareholders activism in the system of corporate governance. Some existing methods of abusing minority shareholders rights, made by joint-stock companies executives, are generalized. The recommendations for minority shareholder's rights protection are given. The necessity for the implementation of the stakeholders-oriented approach for the CSIS creation on the base of companies' security principles is substantiated. The need for corporate governance intelligence arises from the potential conflicts of interests among stakeholders in the corporate structure. These conflicts of interests (agency problems) arise from two main sources. Firstly, different stakeholders have different goals and preferences. Secondly, the stakeholders have imperfect information as to each others' actions, knowledge, and preferences. The ownership structure in Ukraine was formed under condition of mass privatization which is caused the great number of small shareholders' appearance. At the beginning of 1992, nearly 17 million of Ukrainians—one third of the country population—own shares of 35 thousand national joint-stock companies. Minority shareholders did not know their own rights and could not protect their rights in accordance with the law. Corporate management staff let abuses happen, which are also provoked by shareholders' legal irresponsibility and lack of law defense. Moreover, in a highly diffuse ownership structure, there is no incentive for any owner to monitor corporate management. In condition, when security market did not work and the market share value was not determined, small shareholders sold their shares namely to corporate management. Under such conditions, the Ukrainian oligarchic system was developed and during Leonid Kuchma's second presidential term took its final form. In 2014, the combined wealth of Ukraine's 50 richest oligarchs is equal to 85% of Ukraine's GDP. The total worth of the wealthiest 50 Ukrainians is $112.7 billion, as much as two annual Ukrainian state budgets. Furthermore, according to Holoyda (2013), 100 individuals represented the

Corporate Governance Intelligence: Minority Shareholder’s Aspects (Evidence From Ukraine)