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The 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution granted substantial independence to the judiciary. There are institutional guarantees (financial and administrative autonomies / self-governance), functional guarantees (tenure, irremovability and irreducible salary) and protection of independence. On the other hand, despite the substantial judicial independence is observed before the Constitutional Amendment (EC) 45/2004 (judicial reform and creating of National Council of Justice - CNJ) deep deficits of vertical-judicial accountability (possibility for citizens to monitor and influence the actions of the judiciary) and horizontal-judicial accountability (judges and courts are controled by other judicial bodies). The paper analyzes, from the definition and differentiation of the concept of judicial accountability and institutional arrangement subsequent to EC 45/2004, as the powers of the CNJ may be exercised to extend the mechanisms of control and accountabilities of the judiciary without restricting the decisional judicial independence

Accountability e independência judiciais: uma análise da competência do Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ)