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DOI: 10.1590/2179-8966/2018/30095 Resumo O debate sobre Reestruturacoes da Divida Soberana (RDS) esta no centro da agenda de politicas economicas globais. Em 2014, o FMI apresentou uma nova proposta contratual –como parte integrante de um conjunto de reformas– para organizar esses processos e permaneceu fora das discussoes destinadas a elaborar um mecanismo estatutario dentro da ONU, o que acentuou as divisoes existentes neste campo. Ao contrario da maior parte da literatura especializada que analisa os limites e potencialidades desta proposta do FMI em termos abstratos, este artigo faz isso atraves de um «jogo de posicoes nas disputas». Esta nova maneira de abordar o debate sobre RDS, que comeca explicitando os pressupostos e os interesses desde onde os agentes falam neste campo, possibilita explicar por que existem nao so opinioes diferentes, mas diretamente opostas, sobre o mesmo fato social (a nova iniciativa do FMI). Argumenta-se que esta proposta supera os modelos contratuais existentes, mas deixa aberto uma margem de incerteza sobre a correta organizacao das reestruturacoes futuras: a profundidade e as implicacoes de tal incerteza no mercado da divida soberana assumem significados particularmente diferentes de acordo com a cosmovisao de cada uma das posicoes abordadas. Palavras-chave: Reestruturacao da divida soberana (RDS); Fundo monetario internacional (FMI); Clausulas de acao coletiva (CACs); Clausulas Pari Passu. Abstract The Sovereign Debt Restructuring (SDR) debate is at the center of the global economic political agenda. In 2014, the IMF issued a new contractual proposal –as an integral part of a set of reforms– to organize these processes but remained outside of the discussions that promoted the creation of an SDR statutory mechanism at the UN, something which marked the existing divisions in the SDR field. Unlike specialized scholars that analyze the limits and potentialities of the IMF contractual proposal in abstracto, this article does it by means of a «game of positions in dispute». This new way of approaching the SDR debate, which starts by making explicit the assumption and interests from where the agents in this field speak, helps to explain why there are not only diverse but directly opposite opinions about the same social fact (the IMF new proposal). It is argued that this proposal improves the existing models of contractual clauses, but it leaves a margin of uncertainty about the correct organization of future restructuring processes: the Rev. Direito e Prax., Rio de Janeiro, Vol. XX, N. X, 2018, p. XX-XX. Alejandro Gabriel Manzo DOI: 10.1590/2179-8966/2018/30095| ISSN: 2179-8966 3 depth and implications of this uncertainty in the sovereign debt market acquire particularly different meanings according to the worldview of each of the addressed positions. Keywords:  Sovereign debt restructuring (SDR); International monetary fund (IMF); United nations (UN); Collective action clauses (CACs); Pari Passu Clauses.

Where do they speak from? Positions about the new IMF contractual proposal for ordering sovereign debt restructurings