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We consider a two-sided matching market in which the traders are partitioned into two sets; the set of sellers and the set of buyers. Each seller owns at most one indivisible good and each buyer owns a certain amount of money. Money is assumed to be an integer variable. Each trader can trade with at most one trader of the opposite side. The marriage model of Gale and Shapley is a special case of our model. We give a constructive proof to show the existence of a pairwise stable outcome.

PAIRWISE STABILITY IN A TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKET WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS AND MONEY