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Moral licensing describes the phenomenon that displaying moral behavior can lead to subsequent immoral behavior. This is usually explained by the idea that an initial moral act affirms the moral self-image and hence licenses subsequent immoral acts. Previous metaanalyses on moral licensing indicate significant overall effects of d > .30. However, several large replication studies have either not found the effect or reported a substantially smaller effect size. The present article investigated whether this can be attributed to publication bias. Datasets from two previous meta-analyses on moral licensing were compared and when necessary modified. The larger dataset was used for the present analyses. Using PET-PEESE and a three-parameter-selection-model (3-PSM), we found some evidence for publication bias. The adjusted effect sizes were reduced to d = -.05, p = .64 and d = .18, p = .002, respectively. While the first estimate could be an underestimation, we also found indications that the second estimate might exaggerate the true effect size. It is concluded that both the evidence for and the size of moral licensing effects has likely been inflated by publication bias. Furthermore, our findings indicate that culture moderates the moral licensing effect. Recommendations for future meta-analytic and empirical work are given. Subsequent studies on moral licensing should be adequately powered and ideally pre-registered. INFLATION OF MORAL LICENSING BY PUBLICATION BIAS 3 Has the evidence for moral licensing been inflated by publication bias? Moral licensing theory postulates that initially displaying a moral action increases the probability of subsequent behavior that is immoral, unethical or otherwise problematic (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). This phenomenon has been investigated in several studies across various life domains. For instance, previous gender-egalitarian acts were demonstrated to result in an increased likelihood of subsequent gender-discriminatory behavior in form of characterizing stereotypically masculine jobs as better suited for men than women (Monin & Miller, 2001). Similarly, participants who were initially given the chance to purchase green products subsequently shared less money in an interpersonal interaction task and stole more money in a self-gratification paradigm (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). Strikingly, the moral licensing effect appears to be at odds with several prominent psychological findings and theories which imply a human striving for consistency (Blanken, van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Meijers, 2014). For instance, self-perception theory (Bem, 1972) posits that people constantly observe their own behavior in order to draw conclusions about their own attitudes. These inferred attitudes strongly influence subsequent behavior and are thought to establish consistency. The observed inconsistency in human behavior described as moral licensing, by contrast, was explained by drawing upon a moral self-regulation framework (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). Specifically, the predicted costs associated with a future ethical deed were argued to be counted against the gains in moral self-concept acquired by previous moral actions. Thus, whenever faced with the uncertainty whether their next behavior might appear morally questionable, an individual’s clean moral record might license an ensuing immoral behavior without threatening the previously verified ethical selfconcept (Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009). For illustration, a personnel manager who has just objected a set of racist statements might feel licensed to prefer a White over an equally qualified Black applicant without having to readapt his non-racist self-concept. Similarly, an initial moral transgression was reasoned to threaten an individual’s perceived moral self-concept (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). In order to reinstate an internal balance and to regain confidence in the moral self-concept, the individual might therefore engage in an ensuing compensatory moral action (Sachdeva et al., 2009). For instance, writing a story about oneself using negative words (such as greedy, disloyal, selfish) as compared to neutral words (book, keys, house) increased the mean amount of money participants indicated they would donate to charity (Sachdeva et al., 2009). This set of compensatory behaviors following a moral transgression is known as moral cleansing (Sachdeva et al., 2009). Thus, INFLATION OF MORAL LICENSING BY PUBLICATION BIAS 4 both the moral cleansing and the moral licensing effect could be argued to reflect the outcome of constant moral cost-benefit calculations. Moderators of the moral licensing effect are largely unknown (Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015), but Simbrunner and Schlegelmilch (2017) recently provided evidence for two potential moderators: (1) The culture of the studied population and (2) the type of control condition (neutral vs. immoral previous behavior). Specifically, they argued that the cultural background of participants shapes their moral standards by processes of socialization and thus influences their moral self-concept. Culture should hence moderate the moral licensing effect (Simbrunner & Schlegelmilch, 2017). Additionally, they showed that the effect was larger when a previous moral behavior was contrasted with a previous immoral behavior instead of a neutral control condition.