English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

<div class="col-sm-9"><h4>Abstract</h4><p>This paper introduces rational expectations voting into an agentbasedmodel of collective choice. Our model is unique because itgenerates sophisticated forecasts of endogenous policy outcomes bycomputationally sampling the space of exogenous random variables.Together these forecasts generate a common prior, a joint distributionof all random variables as a function of the set of policy choices,which agents use to select the policy that maximizes their expectedutility. We apply our simulated rational expectations methodologyby using administrative data on property taxes from two U.S.cities to investigate how observed levels of (plausibly exogenous)tax-payment uncertainty affect collective choice. Specifically, weshow that, for sophisticated risk-averse or loss-averse voters, higherlevels of tax-payment uncertainty generate majority support for abinding constraint on collective choice.</p><div><strong>DOI:</strong>10.1561/105.43</div></div>

Rational Expectations Voting in Agent-Based Models: An Application to Tax Ceilings