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Investigating the Pāli suttas, compiled prior to the development of Abhi­ dhamma, from a phenomenological perspective reveals an internally coher­ ent and consistent doctrine/theory whose crucial theme is the intentionality and subjectivity of consciousness. Reductive interpretat ions tend to inter­ pret the basic Buddhist principle of ‘non­self ’, and i ts correlative repudia­ tion of the concept/conceit ‘I am’, as entailing a rejection of any genuine (phenomenological) meaningfulness for the term ‘I’ as a legitimate expres­ sion of subjectivity, intentionality, and consciousne ss. Indeed, it is occasion­ ally even claimed that Buddhas and Arahants cannot po ssess subjective intentional consciousness at all. In the following re lections, then, a few key aspects of an alternative (phenomenological) perspect ive upon early Pāli Buddhism are introduced and sketched out, whereby it is arg ued that the presence of subjective intentional consciousness, even in the case of Bud­ dhas and Arahants, is not only presupposed by the suttas, and is not only quite unproblematic for early Buddhist doctrine/theory, but is also actually of fundamental importance for the very possibility of B uddhist truth and practice. Thus, early Buddhist doctrine/theory is not only non­reductive; it also eminently invites a deep dialogue with, and a serious and detailed interpretation from the perspective of, Transcendental Ph enomenology.

‘I’ without ‘I am’: On the Presence of Subjectivity in Early Buddhism, in the Light of Transcendental Phenomenology