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The notes that compose On Certainty (Uber Gewissheit) clearly express the concern of Ludwig Wittgenstein with the classic problems of epistemology, in particular the use of traditional epistemic terms and the usual mistakes of philosophers who neglect their deep grammatical structures. In various passages is easy to observe the attempt to clarify errors of the realistic, idealistic and skeptical with regard to our common claims of knowledge in moderate skeptical contexts. The issue of skepticism about the justification is a recurring theme in Contemporary Analytical Epistemology and, in a sense, the solutions offered to this problem are not fully adequate. There are many passages in On Certainty that have the potential to shed light on fundamental questions that are intertwined in this debate, whose the contemporary discussion has been fostered by provocative analysis offered by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2005, 2007). This article is just trying to sketch a possible Wittgenstein’s response to the epistemic regress problem.

WITTGENSTEIN: UMA SOLUÇÃO FUNDACIONISTA AO PROBLEMA DO REGRESSO EPISTÊMICO