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When the Traetatus Logieo-Philosophieus was being prepared for its English edition, C.K. Ogden suggested as its English title, "Philosophical Logic". It was rejected by Wittgenstein because he did not think there was any such thing as philosophical logic. In fact, one of the points of his critique of Prineipia Mathematiea was that it tried to make a case for philosophical logic, i.e. to find a "foundation for logic" and to formalize it. One cannot, however, layout or say what the formal properties of a proposition are. This is shown by the proposition itself (6.12).1 One cannot determine by rules what a valid inference is, for this is already shown in the inference itself (5.132). One cannot stipulate or define that signs are a proposition having a sense, for that something is a proposition is shown by the proposition itself (5.5351). This is Wittgenstein's well-known doctrine that what is shown in language cannot be said. It is difficult to elucidate the doctrine of showing without simply repeating it. I think the reason for this is that the doctrine represents a synoptic view of the nature of language in general, and such synoptic views (like a view about the nature of philosophy) cannot be explained they can only be illustrated. This indeed is how Wittgenstein presents the doctrine in the Traetatus. He gives various illustrations, and in spite of the apparent divergencies of these illustrations I think they possess a common core which is a general view about the nature of language and meaning. If one accepts this view of language, one can understand and appreciate Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell. If one fails to see language this way, then these criticisms will appear innocuous and have so appeared to many philosophers. Indeed, Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell and frege have had little, if any, impact upon the course of logic. This, I think., ·;s oecause logicians, in general, are far removed from the view of language represented by the doctrine of showing. for similar reasons, Russell never admitted the force of Wittgenstein's criticisms of Prineipia, and most likely never fully understood the Tractatus. In both cases this was due to his failure to grasp the impact of the doctrine of showing. Russell was hardly alone in this misunderstanding, for according to the letter that Witt-

"Showing" in the <i>Tractatus</i>: the Root of Wittgenstein and Russell's Basic Incompatibility