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Wittgenstein’s writings on religious and magical beliefs, especially the “Lectures on Religious Belief” and “Remarks on Frazer’s  Golden Bough ” are taken to imply semantic incommensurability and inaccessibility by the  Wittgensteinian Fideism  and, in part, the  expressivist  interpretation. According to these interpretations, religious and non-religious discourses are self-contained, closed, and not intertranslatable. Wittgenstein is taken to deny  mutual understanding  between believers and non-believers with respect to religious and magical discourse. I argue against such interpretations and support readings by Kusch, Schroeder, and Tripodi that are optimistic of the possibility of mutual understanding. Nevertheless, there is a danger of scepticism for such optimistic readings when they refer to a special attitude that is needed to understand religious belief and speech. I offer a reply to this problem and suggest to see Wittgenstein’s stance on understanding religious discourse in a greater proximity to his general views about language in his later writings. Then, however, any fideist view of the religious (and magical) form of life as self-contained and isolated from the non-religious has to be repudiated.

Wittgenstein on Understanding Religious Beliefs: Some Remarks against Incommensurability and Scepticism