English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

J. Robert G. Williams argues that referential indeterminacy may arise as a result of ontic indeterminacy, and that lambda-abstraction is not applicable to indeterminate identity statements, i.e., statements of the form, ‘it is indeterminate whethera   $$a$$    is identical withb   $$b$$   ,’ if they involve such ontically induced referential indeterminacy; so Evans’sr  e  d  u  c  t  i  o   $$reductio$$    argument against vague objects does not work. This paper finds fault with Williams’s defense of vague objects and shows that there is much reason to doubt that the idea of ontically induced referential indeterminacy plays any significant role in a proper defense of vague objects against Evans’s argument.

Referential Indeterminacy with an Ontic Source? – A Criticism of Williams’s Defense of Vague Objects