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In the  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , Kant explains a perfect duty as one that “admits no exception in favor of inclination”. An imperfect duty must then, in turn, be one which does admit such exceptions. However, according to Kant, all duties are valid without exception, and so there has been broad agreement among Kantians and Kant interpreters from the beginning that perfect duties cannot be characterized by exceptionless validity. I would thus like to argue in favor of a different reading of Kant’s explanation. My thesis is that he uses the term ‘exception’ in quite different ways, as can be documented, for instance, in the  Metaphysics of Morals  and the  Critique of Pure Reason . The term then has another meaning, and this is also the case in the passage in question in the  Groundwork .

Was versteht Kant unter einer „Ausnahme“?: Zur Unterscheidung vollkommener und unvollkommener Pflichten in der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten