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What does Kant claim to have shown in the Resolution of the Third Antinomy (RTA)? A recent publication by Bernd Ludwig shows the shortcomings of a fairly broad interpretative consensus around the claim that all that is at stake in the RTA is the mode of  logical  possibility. I argue that there is a lack of clarity as to  what  logical possibility, and that the  real  possibility of transcendental freedom (TF) is examined in much of the RTA. Ludwig’s own proposal that Kant  shows  the real possibility of TF however faces major problems. I formulate an alternative proposal that pays due attention to the claim of the antinomy’s thesis, the evolution of the argument of the RTA, and Kant’s later textual references to it. This also deals with the thorny issue of the relation between practical and TF.

Kant and the Possibility of Transcendental Freedom