English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

The focus of this paper is on the concepts of practical and transcendental freedom, their relation to each other, and their role in Kant’s (moral) philosophy. It is argued that there is in this regard neither an inconsistency or contradiction between the  Dialectic  and the  Canon  of the first  Critique  nor a break between the first and the second  Critique . The  Canon’ s claim that we cognize practical freedom through experience must by no means be understood as implying that Kant held a “naturalized” concept of freedom. The paper also reveals the preparatory role of the first  Critique  with respect to the moral philosophy that Kant, beginning in the  Groundwork , presented in the following years.

Zur Rolle der Freiheit in Kants (Moral-)Philosophie