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The tort of outrage has been sidelined in recent decades by judges and academics who question its legitimacy. This Article is an attempt to move outrage from the margins to the center of American tort law. It begins by unearthing the complex intellectual history that produced judicial skepticism about this tort. The Legal Realists who “invented” outrage made a strategic decision to condition liability on the “outrageousness” of behavior rather than to identify discrete acts as wrongful. This doctrinal indeterminacy was necessary to quell corporate opposition to the tort. Ultimately, however, it has led modern courts and scholars to label outrage as “inherently subjective” and therefore “disfavored.”

The Tort of Outrage and Some Objectivity about Subjectivity