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The observation that human action is mediated by social institutions comprises the beginning oS any theory of social order. Differing explanations of the origins and functions of such iristitutions will lead to very divergent conceptions of the nature of social order and the role that human action and human reason can play in establishing it. In particular, those who ascribe the origin of social institutions to human design will see socia1,order as the product of specific acts of huinan reason, while tliose who prefer evolutionary explanations of institutions mrill tend to view social order as deriving from the accumulated human wisdom and tradition embedded in institutions that have sunrived the process of social evolution. Tlie purpose of this paper is to compare the origins and functions US mio specific social institulions, money and law! using an evolutionary approach that sees social institutions as the results of human action but not human design. More specifically, I wish to point out some striking sirllilarities between two recent sets of litcrature relating to the role of government in the production of money and law. An evolutionary approach to institutions can provide a common frarnen~ork for examining the theory of free banking1 and the more recent work o n the nonpolitical provision of The similarities between money and law as social

Spontaneity and Design in the Evolution of Institutions: The Similarities of Money and Law