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During World War II an increasing share of the industrial output of Germany and the Nazi-ruled European economies was converted for use in the German war effort. In order to steer this conversion, information gathering and processing were crucial. This paper examines the institutions and instruments of the German system of information gathering and processing and tries to identify its successes and failures. It will be shown that the origins of the system stemmed predominately from specific bottlenecks Germany faced during the pre-war period, which necessitated a more active role of the state given the aims of the Nazi regime. The ad-hoc character of some of the measures implemented in order to improve the information basis of the German economic administration produced a system which was ill-coordinated and incomplete. During the war, the information needs further increased and several reforms considerably improved the information basis of the state. Nevertheless, some fundamental problems stemming from the private-property based economic order in Germany and the specific industrial structure remained unresolved even after Speer had become armaments minister.

Die Grenzen der Informationsbeschaffung, -transfer und -verarbeitung in der deutschen Wehr- und Kriegswirtschaftsverwaltung im Dritten Reich