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There is a persistent debate in legal theory concerning the correct way of approaching written statutes. The parties can roughly be divided into textualists, who think that the law-applier should stick to the text of the statute, and purposivists (or intentionalists), who either think that the interpreter should take text-external purposes and intentions into account, or that the law-applier  necessarily  does that whenever she interprets a statute. My aim in this article is not to decide which approach better advances fairness and justice, but to investigate the assumptions about the nature of language and meaning that are presupposed in the debate, and evaluate these assumptions with the help of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Paul Grice. The article ends by overcoming, at the level of meaning, the dichotomy between text and purpose, and by reminding us of the responsibility that this conception of meaning brings about.

Fairness in statutory interpretation: Text, purpose or intention?