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This paper presents and discusses Karl Löwith’s anthropological critique of existential analytic that is formulated in his Habilitation thesis ( Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen , 1928), where he develops an anthropological counter-paradigm, i. e.  Mitanthropologie , in opposition to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Given the extent and the complexity of such a subject, I will limit the present inquiry to two specific topics: the  Miteinandersein  (Being-with-one-another) and above all the  Sein zum Tode  (Being-towards-death). In practice, I will first explain the basic features of Mitanthropologie together with the crucial critique that it levels at  Being and Time . I will follow by outlining the importance of the  Todesfrage  (the question of death) within the existential analytic by means of a comparison between Heidegger’s  Being - towards - death  and Kierkegaard’s  Sickness unto death  ( Krankheit zum Tode ). Finally, I will expound Löwith’s objection to  Being - towards - death , which is expressed in the alternative formula  Freiheit zum Tode  (Freedom-towards-death).

Mitmensch contra Dasein: Karl Löwiths anthropologische Kritik an der Daseinsanalytik