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This paper studies how the congestion of its editorial process affects an academic journal. In a publishing game played by researchers and editors, we assume that quality screening by editors depends on their ability to properly process the flow of submissions. When too many papers arrive, this ability declines and editors may reject good papers or accept papers with little contribution to scientific knowledge. In this game, a separating equilibrium always exists in which only good researchers submit their papers to the journal. Each paper is accepted and the quality of the journal reaches its highest level. However, when the researchers’ reward for each publication exceeds a given threshold, two hybrid equilibria are also feasible. In these equilibria, authors of low-quality papers submit their papers to the journal and, as the flow of papers exceeds the editors’ capacity of perfect assessment, the selection process becomes imperfect. This creates an opportunity for authors to submit poor quality papers, a behaviour which contributes to the congestion of the editorial process. The various strategies implemented by the editors to oppose congestion are then discussed.

Congestion of Academic Journals Under Papers’ Imperfect Selection