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It is well attested that Aristotle identifi es living things, such as animals and plants within the sublunary region, as the paradigm instances of substances. From the standpoint of unity, they are more unifi ed than non-living things such as heap-like elements (earth, water, air, and fi re) and artifi cial products (like beds and houses). Rather, living organisms are the most unifi ed things. Thus, if we appeal to unity as the criterion of substantiality, it would seem that all living organisms turn out to be substances. As a matter of fact, this view has been endorsed by many commentators. In contrast to their view, in this paper I shall argue that not all living organisms enjoy unity in the same degree. In fact, some are not suffi ciently unifi ed to be classifi ed as substances. The truly unifi ed or-

Substantial Unity and Living Things in Aristotle