English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

In different formulations, the principle that it is worse for a person to do injustice than to suffer it figures most prominently in three of the Socratic dialogues: the  Apology, Crito , and  Gorgias . To understand this principle (which I will call the “principle about justice”), and in particular to find some justification for Socrates' unwavering confidence in it, much attention has understandably centered on the  Gorgias , since there Socrates does not simply assert the principle to an audience which does not respond (as in the  Apology ) nor does he propose it to someone who accepts it with little resistance (as in the  Crito ). Both Polus and Callicles reject it, albeit in different ways. The presence of such anti-Socratic opponents suggests that we will at last hear a defense of this central Socratic principle. When we arrive at the arguments, however, we are disappointed. Jonathan Lear calls Socrates' arguments against Callicles “among the most unconvincing arguments in the Platonic corpus“. And the arguments against Callicles are generally thought to be significantly  better  than the arguments that Socrates offers against Polus.

Disputing Socratic Principles: Character and Argument in the “Polus Episode” of the Gorgias