English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Insights

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

This paper discusses Descartes’ and Spinoza’s epistemological approaches under the perspective of how they contribute to the project of an ethics of belief. I argue that the problem of doxastic voluntarism is only one of two issues to be addressed within an ethics of belief. Another equally important concern is the question of how we can make sure that the rational control over our judgments does not override the truth-sensitivity of our beliefs. It is against this background that I compare Descartes’ and Spinoza’s views on how we may have some rational control over our own beliefs.

Doxastische Selbstkontrolle und Wahrheitssensitivität: Descartes und Spinoza über die Voraussetzungen einer rationalistischen Ethik der Überzeugungen